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CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO TRIAL:
RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
PAUL H. SANDERS*
"The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards. And the effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires
disregard of fair procedures imposed by law."'
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people."2

Probably the most pervasive dilemma in human experience is that which
poses the choice with respect to the use of normally-condemned means in
order to attain what are considered to be desirable ends. The field of criminal
law administration offers a particularly apt illustration of the dilemma in
modern society. The actual, day-to-day methods of operation of our law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other officials concerned with
the investigation, trial and punishment of those charged with crime,-all
reflect the choice that has been made in fact by our society. We can each
judge, within the limits of our experience, which set of values has been
accorded preferred status in our community; or rather what accommodation
has been made with respect to the competing sets of values.
The quoted words which introduce this paper suggest that any solution
of the dilemma which sacrifices procedural safeguards because of the exigencies of the immediate situation tends to undermine the whole structure of
liberty. They also suggest that such a choice is not necessary in the practical
matter of law enforcement. Twenty years ago the Wickersham Commission
went further than this and showed that "lawlessness in law enforcement"
actually defeats its own ends: "Respect for law, which is the fundamental
prerequisite of law observance, hardly can be expected of people in general
if the officers charged with the enforcement of the law do not set the example
of obedience to its precepts."' 3 Neither the passage of time nor developments
such as the recent investigations of the Crime Committee of the United
States Senate suggest that the observation is any less true today than when
it was made. In spite of this, however, cases continue to arise in the courts
which indicate that at least some law enforcement agencies are not overly
scrupulous in their respect for the laws which supposedly control their
actions.
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. Frankfurter, J., in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, 63, Sup. Ct. 608,
87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
2. Frankfurter, J., in United States v.Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68, 69, 70 Sup.
Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
3. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 1 (1931) ; cf. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240,
241, 60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940).
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It must be recognized, of course, that those charged with some phase
of criminal law administration have no easy task in staying within the
limits of the law, even when they have a sincere desire to do so. The legality
of the conduct of a local policeman, for example, may have to be determined
by reference to such diverse sources as city ordinances, city charter, state
statutes, state constitution, state court decisions concerning the common
law or interpreting any of the foregoing documents,-all in addition to the
requirements of the Federal Constitution as authoritatively interpreted by
the courts. Though it may be difficult for a particular law enforcement
officer to know precisely what by law he is permitted or required to do,
the obligations in this regard do not seem demonstrably more burdensome
than those placed upon citizens generally to be law-abiding. Certainly the
difficulty puts a particular responsibility, in the light of the Vickersham
Report observation, upon those charged with training and directing lawenforcement personnel and upon prosecutors and representatives of the judiciary having the opportunity of frequent, direct contact with such personnel.

1.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION IN GENERAL

It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of the legal requirements
placed upon those engaged in certain phases of criminal law administration,
whether federal, state or local, by reason of the Constitution of the United
States. In this field particularly it should be borne in mind that rights given
to accused persons by the Constitution are minimal 4 -not indicative necessarily of the standards that should be set under the most desirable methods
of administration. To say that a certain procedure is "constitutional" is
the least you can say about valid conduct of governmental representatives. 5
Those responsible for drafting and inserting the Bill of Rights in the
Federal Constitution must have been deeply impressed with the need for
restricting governmental activity in the procedures to be followed in criminal
law enforcement. Four of the first eight amendments to the Constitution detail
one or more such procedural requirements. 6 These were in addition to those
set forth in the body of the document. 7 The application of these constitutional
4. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 Sup. Ct. 608; 87 L. Ed.
819 (1943).
5. See Curtis, A Modern Supreme Court in a Modern World, 4 VAND. L. REv.
427, 433 (1951).
6. Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) ; Fifth Amendment (grand jury, double
jeopardy, privilege against self-incrimination, due process); Sixth Amendment (jury
trial, information as to charge, confrontation of witnesses, compulsion to obtain defense
witnesses, assistance of counsel); Eighth Amendment (bail, cruel and unusual punishment).
7. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 and 3 (habeas corpus, bill of attainder, ex post facto law)
Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (same except for habeas corpus, as against states) ; Art. III, § 2,
cl. 3 (jury trial) ; Art. III, § 3, cl. 1, 2 (definition of treason, evidence required, attainder for treason).
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restrictions plus those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment upon the
states continues to involve a large volume of litigation.8 The extent to which
the specific limitations upon the Federal Government are similarly applicable
to the states is a subject that refuses to remain quiescent. 9
This paper will examine cases arising in the United States Supreme
Court since the close of hostilities in World War II. Only cases involving the
constitutionality of aspects of criminal law administration by a state or the
Federal Government prior to trial on the merits will be covered. One purpose of this concentration on the pretrial workings of the machinery which
administers criminal justice is to emphasize the existence of constitutional
rights which have no necessary relationship to the cluster of rights covered
by "right to a fair trial."'10 What happens at the trial and subsequent thereto
is normally within the spotlight of public attention. It is in the area where
this public scrutiny does not reach that there is greatest need to emphasize
the constitutional limits on governmental activity. This is demonstrated
most obviously in the case of those persons who are subjected to the operations of law-enforcing agencies, but are never brought to trial in court on a
criminal charge.
2.

SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES"

There are judicial utterances which seem to suggest that it is inappropriate to speak of the existence of constitutional rights prior to trial of
the accused in a criminal case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in the same
case from which one of the introductory quotations was taken: "We are not
concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement."' 2 Can it be appropriate,
therefore, to speak of the investigating activity of Federal law enforcement
8. See Frank, Court and Constitution: The Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. REV.
400, 401 (1951). Frank lists 145 constitutional decisions by the United States Supreme
Court in the 1946-50 period, of which 47 relate to criminal procedure. For general

discussions of the problem see REPPY, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES C. 8 (1951) ;
Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 266 (1946) ; Orfield, What Constitutes Fair Criminal Procedure Under
Municipal and International Law, 12 U. OF PITT. L. Rlv. 35 (1950).
9. Compare the various opinions in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup.
Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947); see Note, The Adamson Case: A Study in Constitutional Techniques, 58 YALE L.J. 268 (1949), particularly 279-86.
10. See summaries of the coverage of this phrase in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,

273, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
236-37, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
285-86, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial,
6 TEMsP. L.Q. 381 (1932).

11. Recent general treatments include

MACHEN,

THE

LAW

OF

SEARCH

AND

SEIzuRE (1950) ; Fraenkel-, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and
Seizures, 33 IOWA L. Rv. 472 (1948) ; Ramsey, Acquisition of Evidence by Search
and Seizure, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1949) ; Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable
Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).

12. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943).
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officers as being "unconstitutional" apart from a subsequent and related
use of the fruits of their conduct in court? A similar doubt with respect to
the activity of state officers might follow such an expression as that by
Mr. Justice Roberts in Lisenba v. California:13 "Moreover, petitioner does
not, and cannot, ask redress in this proceeding for any disregard of due
process prior to his trial."
These utterances find corroboration in the undeniable fact that "search
and seizure" and "privilege against self-incrimination" are considered frequently only as an aspect of the law of Evidence. It is fully recognized that,
as a practical matter, the only opportunity normally open to a court to
check on the investigational phase of law enforcement, including methods
used by officers to secure evidence and other circumstances surrounding its
acquisition, is in connection with the use of evidence so acquired, at the
preliminary hearing or at the trial Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution does not refer expressly to the matter of trial at
all. Literally, its words would seem to be a direct limitation upon those
representatives of government engaged in the investigation of crime or the
seizure and detention of individuals suspected of crime. The judiciary are
restrained by the words of the amendment only as they might be called
upon to issue warrants to those directly concerned with investigation of
crime or arrest of individuals.
A.

State Cases

The Supreme Court, in 1949, announced for the first time (and with
apparent unanimity) that the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment were
equally applicable to the states. The case, which obliged the- Court to give
full-dress consideration to the impact of the Fourth Amendment apart from
the question of admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence, was Wolf v.
Colorado.14 Since it held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require
a state to exclude in a criminal trial evidence obtained by unconstitutional
search and seizure, the remarks in the majority opinion concerning the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and its relation to the Fourteenth
were not necessary to the decision. Still they are illuminating with respect to
the limits imposed b.y the Federal Constitution on the investigational activities of law enforcement officers, federal as well as state. In this case the
Supreme Court of Colorado had sustained the conviction of Wolf although
the evidence admitted against him had been obtained under circumstances
amounting to an unreasonable search and seizure under the law applicable to
13. 314 U.S. 219, 235, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941).
14. 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949); cf. State v. Mara, 78
A.2d 922 (N.H. 1951).
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federal criminal prosecution. In holding that the manner in which evidence is
obtained does not affect its admissibility the Colorado court followed the
majority approach in the state courts in opposition to the Federal rule first
applied in Weeks v. United States.15
To place the problem in its proper setting, the majority opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado first pointed out that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as against federal action are not necessarily
incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
against state action. 16 Continuing, the opinion states that "due process"
in state criminal law administration requires those procedures which are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (to use Mr. Justice Cardozo's
phrase in Palko v. Connecticut),17 whether embodied in the specific requirements of the Federal Bill of Rights or not. Justice Frankfurter recognizes
that this falls short of being a "tidy formula for .. .easy determination,"
but as applied to the field of search and seizure the result is positive:
"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the policewhich is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the Concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by
day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the
authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history
and basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples."'
After this bold pronouncement the majority opinion differentiates between the unconstitutionality of the illegal search and seizure by state officers
and the unconstitutionality of a state court conviction of an accused based
upon the adimission in evidence of the fruits of such activity. The fact
that most of the states and many foreign jurisdictions do not exclude evidence by reason of illegality in its acquisition is found to support the finding
that the Palko test does not require the exclusionary rule. If such illegal
excursions were given an affirmative sanction by a state it would be violative
of due process, but a state is not obliged to apply the negative sanction
of nonadmissibility of evidence in order to meet the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The implication is that the obligation of the state
is fully met by providing, either on a common law or statutory basis, for
redress of private rights or for public sanctions in cases where state law
15. 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) ; cf. Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
16. Citing the Court's recent re-examination of this topic in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947), and concluding, "The issue is
closed." 338 U.S. at 26.
17. 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
18. 338 U.S. at 27-28.
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enforcement officers indulge in conduct analogous to that falling within the
prohibition of the Fourth Amendment as against federal officers:
"We cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand

such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the
remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the
police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford."'"

Mr. Justice Black concurred in the decision for the reason that he
did not regard the exclusionary rule with respect to illegally-obtained
evidence as necessarily required by the Fourth Amendment.2 0 He stresses
his belief that the Fourth Amendment in its entirety is applicable to the
states. He observes that the Amendment was designed to protect the people
against unrestrained searches and seizures by sheriffs, policemen and other
law enforcement officers and such protection from "over-zealous or ruthless
state officers" is no less essential than with respect to federal officers. Three
judges dissented because of the conviction that the exclusionary rule is the
only effective sanction against conduct which all agree is condemned by the
due process clause and the Fourth Amendment. "For there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all."' 2 1 Mr. Justice
Murphy's opinion analyzed the alternative remedies which are allegedly
provided by the states and found them illusory. As for criminal sanctions:
"Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we
expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for wellmeaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the District
Attorney or his associates have ordered."'22 Civil actions in trespass against
officers have too many difficult hurdles to overcome to be effective as a
deterrent. In cities throughout the country the actual training and operating
rules for police officers with respect to adhering to legal requirements in
securing evidence are found to reflect, normally, the existence or nonexistence
of the exclusionary rule. Justice Rutledge's separate dissenting opinion
stressed his rejection of the idea that the exclusionary rule at the federal
level is only a judicially-created rule of evidence and that it could be elimi23
nated by Congress passing an appropriate statute.
The Wolf decision is the only one in the period under investigation which
involved illegal search and seizure in state criminal prosecutions. It may
be noted that the court was unanimously of the opinion that the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment are equally binding upon state law enforcement
19. Id. at 31.

20. Id. at 39.

21. Murphy, J., dissenting, 338 U.S. at 41.
22. Id. at 42.
23. Id. at 47. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746
(1886), was cited in this dissent as having established "dual grounds" (Fourth and
Fifth Amendment bases) for the federal exclusionary rule.
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officers. This holding would seem to require, in logic, an overruling of cases
admitting evidence in federal criminal prosecutions obtained illegally by
state officers acting independently. 24 The judgment of two dissenting justices
that the actual result in that case produces only a "pale and frayed carbon
copy of the original" 25 may be entirely justified. Still there will, undoubtedly,
be some who are charged with the administration of local law-enforcement
programs (and particularly with the training of law-enforcement officers)
who will seek conscientiously to comply with what the court has said is
required by the Federal Constitution, even though no effective direct sanction
is involved.
It should be noted also that, possessing a right clearly established under
the Federal Constitution, the person subjected to unconstitutional search
and seizure activity by state officers may take action to protect that right,
before trial or in the absence of prospect of trial if he can gain access to a
court to seek such relief.2 6 The addition of this to the rights accorded under
state law may well prove of great practical importance. Another factor of
significance in the unanimous view of the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the requirements of the Fourth, is the possibility of criminal
prosecution under the Federal Civil Rights Act 21 of state officers or those
acting under color of state law who violate such rights. More specific or
inclusive federal legislation to enforce or provide remedies for such rights
28
would unquestionably be within the power of Congress.
B. Federal Cases
In light of the distinction drawn in Wolf v. Colorado between constitutionally-prohibited searches and seizures and constitutionally-permitted
use of the results of such undertakings, it is somewhat confusing to read
in other cases involving federal criminal prosecutions language such as:
"The law of searches and seizures as revealed in the decisions of this Court

is the product of the interplay of these two constitutional provisions [Amendments
It reflects a dual purpose-protection of the privacy of the individIV and V] ....
ual, his right to be let alone; protection of the individual against compulsory
production of evidence to be used against him."
24. Cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 69 Sup. Ct. 1372, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949).
25. 338 U.S. at 48.
26. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 235, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166
(1941); Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947).

27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1950). See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 Sup.
Ct. 576 (1951)

(".... where police take matters in their own hands, seize victims,

beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the
police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution"). Id. at 101.
28. See note 27 supra. Also see United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70, 72, 71 Sup.
Ct. 581 (1951).
29. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587, 66 Sup. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946).
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The'above case is not unusual in lumping together the rights of the
accused under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in a federal criminal
prosecution and failing to make clear the basis of the exclusionary rule. One
interesting exception to this approach occurred in a noncriminal proceeding
involving a corporation.30 It was stated that the corporation enjoyed rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment,
even though it could not under established precedent claim a privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. However, compelling
a response to a subpoena duces tecum of the Wage-Hour Administrator
issued in the course of an investigation seeking the production of specified
records of the corporation was held not to constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
The legality of searches and seizures a's a matter of common law hasdepended upon their conformity to the specifications of a valid search
warrant or their being reasonably incident to the making of a lawful arrest. 31
Normally, the constitutional requirement has been assumed to embody
the same general rules in spite of the literal wording of the Fourth Amendment, which might seem to require a warrant, specific as to place and
person or things, before a search and seizure could be valid.3 2 In many
respects the most notable development during the 1945-1951 period was the
short-lived attempt in the Court to declare "unreasonable" a search and
seizure under circumstances where a search warrant, could have been secured, even though the search had been incidental to the making of a lawful
arrest.
The complete cycle of this development and an indication of the sharp
division in the Court on the whole topic can be traced in the cases of Harris
35
34
v. United States, 33 Johnson v. United States, Trupiano v. United States,
37
36
McDonald v. United States, and United States v. Rabinowit.
In Harrisv. United States,38 the items seized (selective service notices
and certificates) were federal property, the unauthorized possession of which
constituted a crime. The seizure occurred from a packet marked "personal"
in a bureau drawer while federal officers were searching the entire apartment of Harris after arresting him there under warrants for fraud involving
30. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 Sup. Ct. 494, 90 L.
particularly at 62-35 (1948).
31. MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIzURE 628-63 (1950); Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L. REv. 509, 613 (1949).
32. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925).
33. 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947).
34. 333 U.S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948).
35. 334 U.S. 699, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948).
36. 335 U.S. 451, 69 Sup. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153 (1948).
37. 339 U.S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950).
38. 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947), Note, 1 VAND L. REv.
60 (1947).

Ed. 614 (1946); see Note, 1 VAND. L. REv. 626-44,
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use of forged checks. The majority opinion regarded the search as not
unreasonable-the arrest was legal and, incidental thereto, the officers could
search the premises for means of committing the crime for which the arrest
was made. Since the officers were legally entitled to be where they were
and engaged in what they were doing when the evidence of this independent
crime was discovered there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
several dissenting opinions stayed within the orthodox framework by registering views that the search of the premises was unreasonable because more
than "reasonably incidental" to the arrest, or that the seizure of "personal
papers" was in any event unreasonable. The opinion was also given in dissent
that, regardless of the other grounds of invalidity, the use of the evidence
violated the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment.
The Harris case has been sharply criticized; it being asserted that the decision, "in effect, resurrected and approved the odious general warrant or
writ of assistance, presumably outlawed by the Fourth Amendment." 30 This
view seems extreme, failing to give due weight to the limitations implicit
in the common law rule which the majority announced as controlling in the
case.40 It is true that the approach would permit general search of the
premises after arrest for a crime the means of committing, or the fruits of
which, would be small enough to be concealed in desks, bureau drawers, etc.
The facts of Harris extend only to seizure when evidence of an independent
crime is conclusively demonstrated by what is found in a search which itself
is undertaken in good faith to find the instruments or fruits of crime for
which a valid arrest is made. The importance of the case needs particular
stress, since, after the deviation noted below, it apparently represents the
viewpoint to which the Court has returned. Of course the Harris case is
readily distinguishable on its facts from the four other cases mentioned, since
it could not be asserted with respect to it that the searchers had knowledge
and opportunity sufficient to secure a search warrant.
The doctrine that searches of premises may still be unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, although reasonably incident to legal arrest, was
suggested in Johnson v. United States41 in 1948. The case involved an arrest
on a narcotics charge without a warrant and the seizure of opium and stillwarm smoking apparatus in the room where the arrest was made. The federal
officers had smelled opium burning inside the room; the door to the room
was opened to the officers and the search followed. It was held that the
evidence seized should have been suppressed because there had been no
39. REPPY, CIVIL

RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

40. Note, 1 VAND. L. REv. 60, 67 (1947). But
AND SEIzURE 88-89 (1950).

235 (1951).

cf. MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARcH

41. 333 U.S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948); ef. McBride v. United

States, 284 Fed. 416 (5th Cir. 1922) (offense committed in officer's presence when he
detects it by sense of smell).
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legal arrest on the premises. It was reasoned that prior to their gaining
access to the room no crime was being committed in the presence of the
officers; nor did the officers have reasonable grounds to believe that a felony
was being or had been committed by any particular person therein. The
opinion states that the officers had enough evidence to get a search warrant
for the room, and there was no indication that the time it would take to secure
the search warrant would result in the loss of the quarry. Therefore, the
inference is, the search warrant should have been secured.
This dictum and suggestion in the Johnson case became the basis of
decision of the court in Trupiano v. United States42 and McDonald v.
United States.43 In Trupiano an arrest without a warrant-was made by officers for the operation of a still. This arrest was considered legal since the
accused in operating the still was engaged in the commission of a felony in
the presence of arresting officers. However, the court held that the still itself
and other contraband used in the illegal operations which had been seized by
the officers should be suppressed as evidence. The search and seizure with
respect to such articles was "unreasonable," and therefore in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, since there was advance knowledge and adequate opportunity to secure a search warrant. The McDonald case involved an unauthorized entrance by officers into premises where one defendant was the tenant of
a single room. Through the transom the officers observed two occupants of the
room and the paraphernalia for a lottery. The officers arrested both occupants
and seized the lottery materials. The Government urged that no violation of
the Fourth Amendment was involved since the tenant could not object to any
illegality in the officers' entering the landlady's premises, and the seizure of the
materials was reasonably incidental to lawful arrest on the premises for a
crime being committed in the officers' presence. The conviction of the
defendants was reversed by the Court, the opinion stating that the evidence
should have been suppressed and the seized property returned to the tenant
of the room because there was no search warrant and no good reason for not
securing one. One concurring opinion (two justices) was to the effect that
the search was unlawful because of the illegality in securing access to the
transom.
The doctrine survived until 1950 when it was flatly and expressly rejected in United States v. RabinoTitg.44 In this case the defendant was
arrested under a warrant for selling forged postage stamps, following which
there was a search of a desk, safe and file cabinet in the room where the
arrest occurred and a number of altered stamps were seized. The search
42. 334 U.S. 699, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REv. 116
(1948).
43. 335 U.S. 451, 69 Sup. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153 (1948).
44. 339 U.S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950).
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was held to be valid, incidental to the making of a lawful arrest on the
premises: The fact that the officers had reason to believe that the accused had
other' forged stamps on the premises and that they could have secured a
search warrant was -not accorded any legal significance in determining the
validity of. the search and seizure. It may be noted that the items seized
were such as would be involved in the offense for which the accused was
arrested-a factor that might be important as a distinction in comparison with
the Harriscase. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion analyzing
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in great detail and urging that
many cases other than Trupiano were invalidated by the decision. 5
The disturbing factor in the Rabinowitz and Harris approaches is the
fact that they necessarily leave a great deal of leeway to the searching (and
arresting) officer. Furthermore they discourage the securing of search
warrants, since a search incidental to a legal arrest (which may also be
without warrant) is given much greater range and flexibility than would ever
be true under a search warrant. Some significance must attach to the fact
that none of the constitutional questions in the period involve search warrants.
Neither officers nor those subject to their searches, however, will be able
to find much certainty in the prevailing formula, involving several judgments
of "reasonableness" in a single transaction of arrest without warrant and
search without search warrant-e.g., the existence of reasonable grounds
to believe a :felony had been committed and of reasonable grounds to believe
that the person arrested had.committed it, and a reasonable search of the premises reasonably incident to arrest there for the particular crime. With the
prospect of being "second-guessed" on such matters by perhaps three different courts the conscientious officer might very well conclude that "the
policeman's lot is not a happy one."
The importance of the legal basis for the arrest where the constitutional
validity of the search hinges on it is illustrated in two recent cases. In Lustig
v. United States,4 6 federal officers joined while it was in progress a search
being made of the premises of the accused by state police. The state police
had a warrant for the arrest of the accused but no search warrant. The
accused was not present, however, and there could not be any arrest. The
search was therefore unconstitutional and the evidence could not be used
against the defendant. In Brinegarv. United States47 federal officers chased
a car driven by the defendant for a mile, forced it off the road and seized
liquor carried in it. It was considered that the car was being driven from
45. "In overruling Trupiano we overrule the underlying principle of a whole

series of recent cases: United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581; Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 ;McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,.
" Id. at 85.
46. 338 U.S. 74, 69 Sup. Ct. 1372, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949).
47. 338 U.S. 160, 69 Sup. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949).
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known sources of supply of illegal liquor to a probable illegal market. Furthermore the car was driven by one who had been arrested earlier for liquor
transportation, who had been seen loading illegal liquor on a previous
occasion, who had a reputation for illegal transportation and, finally, who admitted he was transporting liquor when the car was stopped. The majority
held that the search was not unreasonable because there was probable cause
to believe that an offense was being committed even before admission by
the driver.
The search of a car in liquor cases perhaps stands in a special category
in light of the 1925 decision in Carroll v. United States.48 Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar, urges several significant distinctions between it
and the Carroll case, primarily in terms of the existence of probable cause
before the car was stopped. Several cases point out that, necessarily, a search
is not made valid by what it turns up. 49 One concurring opinion in Brinegar,
however, states that the officers might constitutionally stop the car and
question the driver and that probable cause for the arrest and search could
then be supplied by the admission of the driver. The earlier case of United
States v. Di Re"0 also involved a search related to the occupancy of an automobile. In the case an OPA informer advised his office that he would
be purchasing counterfeit gas coupons from a suspect in a car at a certain
location. An OPA investigator and a city policeman came to the car, saw
the informer with the illegal coupons in his hand, and were advised that they
had been received from the driver. Di Re was also in the car. All three
persons were taken into custody by the policeman, without a warrant. Di
Re was searched and found to have a great many counterfeit coupons, the
possession of which was a misdemeanor, but a conspiracy with regard to the
use of which would be a felony. The Court held that the coupons were the
fruits of an unconstitutional search and a conviction based on them could not
stand. Carroll v. United States51 was considered to be inapplicable-that
precedent permitted the search of a person incident to search of a car believed
to be carrying contrabrand. In the Di Re case the Court points out that the
Carroll decision might be limited since it involved a specific statutory
authorization for a method of enforcing the Prohibition Law. In any event,
in the instant case only the persons in the car were searched, not the car
itself. Mere presence in a suspected dar, the opinion states, does not lay one
open to a personal search having no other lawful basis. The search was not
constitutional because incident to an arrest, since under the circumstances
48. 267 U.S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).

49. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948);

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 Sup. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) ; cf.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 Sup. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949).
50. 332 U.S. 581, 68 Sup. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948).
51. 267 U.S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).
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Di Re could not be lawfully arrested without a warrant. Since no previous
information on Di Re was available to the officer there was no reasonable
basis to believe he had committed a felony involving the counterfeiting of
the stamps or that he had engaged in a criminal conspiracy with respect to
their distribution (also a felony). One might reasonably conclude that this
decision is entirely inconsistent in mood with the later decision in Brinegar.
The search-and-seizure cases of the period under discussion which may
have the greatest long-term significance are those which suggest considerable
relaxation in the constitutional protection when the property involved is
"public" or is required to be made available to governmental inspection by
reason of a general regulation or by reason of work being done by the one
in charge of the premises for the Government under contract. In each
instance the case involved both the constitutionality of the search and seizure
and the possible violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. In Davis v. United States5 2 the offense
involved unlawful possession of gasoline ration coupons. By statute
these coupons were the property of the Government and the supply of them
in a dealer's hands were subject to inspection at any time, at the place
of business during business hours. In this case the defendant opened
the door to his record room on the command of officers, who had no arrest
or search warrant. They had already arrested him for a sale of gasoline
without a coupon by his employee in their presence (a misdemeanor). The
officers had demanded to see the coupons in the office on the ground that
they were government property and had tried to raise a window into the
room. After persisting in his refusal for a time, the defendant, perhaps believing that the room would be broken into, unlocked the door and gave the
coupons involved in the case to the officers. Relying largely upon the 1912
decision in Wilson v. United States,53 the majority opinion (by Mr. Justice
Douglas) made little effort to discuss the case in terms of the normal legal
framework for search and seizure (although it was found that the accused had
consented) :
"The distinction is between property to which the government is entitled to
possession and property to which it is not ...
"Where the officers seek to inspect public documents at the place of business
where they are required to be kept, pertnissible limits of persuasion arc not so
narrow as where private papers are sought. The demand is one of right. When
the custodian is persuaded by argument that it is his duty to surrender them and
he hands them over, duress and coercion will not be so readily implied as where
private papers are involved. The custodian in this situation is not protected against
the production of incriminating documents."'"
52. 328 U.S. 582, 66 Sup. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946).
53. 221 U.S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911).
54. 328 U.S. at 590, 593.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a sharply-worded dissent, analyzing extensively
the historical background for the Fourth Amendment and the 'cases arising
under it, and attaching a detailed legislative study of statutory limitations
on search warrants:
"The Court apparently rules that because the gasoline business was subject to

regulation, the search and seizure of such documents without a warrant is not an
unreasonable search and seizure condemned by the Fourth Amendment. To hold
that the search in this case was legal is to hold that a search which could not be
justified under a search warrant is lawful without it. I cannot escape the conviction
that such a view of the Fourth Amendment makes a travesty of it and of the long
course of legislation in which Congress applied that Amendment." 55

In its stand on the nonapplicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to records and documents required to be kept and made available to public
inspection the Davis case is closely related to the later decisions in Shapiro
v. United States56 and United States v. Hoffman, 57 neither of which involved
a search-and-seizure question. In the first of these cases counsel argued
that it could not be constitutional for an administrative officer to declare
records to be "public" at his, discretion for the purpose of taking them out
of the protection of the Fifth Amendment under the Wilson approach. A
majority of the court rejected this and other arguments and held that evidence obtained by examining records and documents required by OPA
to be kept was not within the protection of the Fifth Amendment; therefore
the statutory immunity provided where records were subpoenaed under
the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 189358 was inapplicable.
In other words the immunity from prosecution and the constitutional privilege
were correlative-no privilege, no immunity. The only limitations on the
doctrine are suggested in the following from the majority opinion:
"It may be assumed at the outset that there are limits which the Government
cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be
inspected by an administrative agency and may be used in prosecuting statutory
violations committed by the record-keeper himself. But no serious misgiving that
those bounds have been overstepped would appear to be evoked when there is a
sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern
so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity
concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject
to inspection by the Administrator."'

Mr. Justice Frankfurter again entered a vigorous dissent, as in Davis, and
after a detailed re-examination of the Wilson case and the state court
authorities cited therein he declared that the cases do not support the
55. Id. at 594-95.

56. 335 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 1375, 92 L. Ed. 1787 (1948).

57. 335 U.S. 77, 68 Sup. Ct. 1413, 92 L. Ed. 1830 (1948).
58. 27 STAT. 443, c. 83, 49 U.S.C.A. § 46 (1929).
59. 335 U.S. 32.
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proposition that the fact that private records are required to be kept by statute
makes them public records by operation of law.60
Zap v. United States0 ' was decided on the same day as the Davis case
and is closely akin to it in some respects. The defendant was charged
with knowingly making a fictitious claim against the Government. Zap
had a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the Navy which included the conducting of test flights. He posted a payment by check to a test pilot
for an amount considerably in excess of amount actually paid to the pilot,
who was induced to indorse a blank check. A statute provided for inspection
and audit of books and records of contractors. The contract itself provided;
"The accounts and records of the contractor shall be open at all times to the
Government and its representatives ....
-12 F.B.I. agents acting for the
Navy made an examination of records at defendant's place of business during
business hours extending over several weeks. The cancelled check which
was the basis of defendant's fictitious claim was demanded by an agent,
turned over to him by defendant and retained by the agent. In holding
that defendant's constitutional rights were not violated in the acquisition of
the check or the subsequent use of it in court, the majority opinion relied
on his having "voluntarily waived" his claims to privacy by specifically
agreeing in the contract to permit inspection of the accounts and records.
The agents were not trespassers, the opinion states; they did not obtain access
by force, fraud or trickery; even if it be assumed that the taking of the
check was unlawful they could testify concerning what they had seen; or
photostats could have been made. To rule out use of the check here would
be to "exalt a technicality to constitutional levels." 63 The majority conceded
that consent to the inspection did not include consent to the taking of the
check but there was no "wrongdoing."
Furthermore: "The waiver of
such rights to privacy and to immunity as petitioner had respecting this
business undertaking for the Government made admissible in evidence all
the incriminating facts." 64 The-same justices dissented as in Davis. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter agreed that "the search was legal and the inspectors
could testify to what they had gleaned from the inspection," but "[t]he
legality of the search does not automatically legalize every accompanying
seizure." 6 The seizure for evidentiary purposes of papers the possession
of which involves no infringement of law violates the Fourth Amendment.
It may be noted that an invalid search warrant had been used here with re60. Id. at 62.
61. 323 U.S. 624, 66 Sup. Ct. 1277, 90 L. Ed. 1477 (1946).
62. Id. at 627.
63. Id. at 630.
64. ibid.
65. Id. at 632.
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spect to use of books and records other than the check. The decision did not
turn on it in any way.
The application of the Fourth Amendment to inspections and investigations such as those by a local health officer under an ordinance was raised in
District of Columbia v. Little66 but-the Supreme Court disposed of the case
without reaching the constitutional question. In the case the occupant
of a house had refused to permit a District of Columbia health officer who
had no warrant of any kind to enter the premises to make the inspection he
was authorized to make by local ordinance. The case involved prosecution
for violation of the ordinance by the .person refusing consent to enter. The
Court of Appeals for the District (with one judge dissenting) affirmed a
reversal of the conviction on the ground that the Fourth Amendment would
protect the householder in refusing to give consent to-the health inspection
unless a warrant were secured. The Supreme Court concluded that "the
accused's conduct was not an interference with or prevention of the inspection
within the meaning of the ordinance.
3.

DETENTION OF THE PERSON AND INDUCING

CONFESSIONS

67

The arrest and detention of a person by officers of the law, acting without
lawful authority to arrest, may be considered a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. 68 Even if the arrest is lawful, however, it is generally
accepted law that the arrested person must be taken "without unnecessary delay" 60 before a magistrate, so that any continued detention will be on the
basis of judicial order. Since this period between arrest and preliminary
hearing is frequently the occasion of the uniformly-condemned "third-degree
practice" for purposes of securing admissions and confessions, courts are
faced with the problem of what effect to give to a failure by officers to
conform to the legal requirement. Should evidence obtained in the course
of such failure to follow the law be treated in the same way as if obtained
by illegal search and seizure? The Supreme Court particularly must consider whether to treat the right to be accorded an expeditious preliminary
hearing as one required by the Constitution. In the last five years it has
apparently moved in that direction, but it stopped short of placing its holdings
upon a constitutional basis.
66. 339 U.S. 1, 70 Sup. Ct. 468, 94 L. Ed. 599 (1950), 3 VAND. L. REV.820 (1950);
cf. Stahl and Kuhn, Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. OF PITT. L. Rav. 256
(1950).

67. See Bader, Coerced Confession and the Due Process Clause, 15. BROOKLYN L.
51 (1948) ; 49 MICH. L. REv. 900 (1951).
68. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 318-19 ,(1942).
69. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE; OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 6, 35 (1930),

REv.

and commentaries, pp. 201-06, 259-60.
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A. State Cases
The extent of developments in the period under discussion may
be better understood if viewed against statements in the majority opinion
7
of the 1941 decision in Lisenba v. California.
" In this case the accused was
held by the police from Sunday morning until Tuesday morning (42 hours)
before being taken before a magistrate. He charged that he was beaten
and, unquestionably, he had been slapped by a policeman-conduct which
was subject to civil and criminal sanctions under state law. Though questioned continuously during this period the accused did not confess. Eleven
days later he was taken from jail to various places for questioning by the
same officials. He was refused an attorney despite his request (a misdemeanor under state law). After about fifteen hours of questioning involving
no physical violence he signed the confession in question.
Of this course of conduct Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
said:
"It may be assumed this treatment of the petitioner also deprived him of his
liberty without due process. . . . But illegal acts, as such, committed in the course
of obtaining a confession, whatever their effect on its admissibility under local
law, do not furnish an answer to the constitutional question we must decide ...
The gravamen of his complaint is the unfairness of the use of his confessions,
and what occurred in their procurement is relevant only as it bears on that issue."t

The opinion goes on to point out that the question under the Fourteenth
Amendment is whether or not the application of the state's rule as to admissibility of confessions worked a "fundamental unfairness" in the particular
case. Such unfairness has been found previously in cases where a coerced
confession was used as a means of obtaining a verdict of guilty:
"To extort testimony from a defendant by physical torture in the very presence
of the trial tribunal is not due process. The case stands no better if torture induces
an extra-judicial confession ...
"A trial dominated by mob violence in the courtroom is not such as due process
demands. The case can stand no better if mob violence anterior to the trial is the
inducing cause of the defendant's alleged confession. If, by fraud, collusion, trickery,
and subornation of perjury on the part of . . . the State, the trial of an accused
person results in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law. The case
can stand no better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured, and used
in the trial."'

When these means are charged, the Court must make an independent
determination of the facts relating to the alleged deprivation of constitutional
right. After such a determination it was concluded: "we cannot hold that
70. 314 U.S. 219, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941).
71. 314 U.S. at 235.
72. Id. at 237.
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the illegal conduct in which the law enforcement officers of California indulged
The defendant was judged to have
. . coerced the confessions. . . . 13
exhibited such self-possession, coolness and acumen throughout his questioning and at the trial as to negative the view "that he had so lost his freedom
of action that the statements made were not his but were the result of the
deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer. '74
Two justices dissented.
*

Cases involving confessions induced by actual or threatened physical
violence are clear, of course, assuming that the facts can be established to
the court's satisfaction. 75 The important development during the 1945-1951
period, however, has been the greater weight attached to the coincidence
of the confession and the illegal detention.76 Three cases were handed down
on the last opinion day in June, 1949, all setting aside state court convictions
based upon extrajudicial confessions, no one of which involved use of cruder
methods of physical violence. 77
In the first of these, WTatts v. Indiana,7 8 the accused was held (part of
the time in a jail cell called tie "hole") without preliminary hearing from
Wednesday until the following Tuesday. He was questioned on each day
except Sunday for eight or nine hours at a stretch intermittently throughout
the day by officers working in relays. After six days of confinement and
questioning and at the conclusion of seven hours of continuous questioning
he gave the confession used in his conviction. The court observes that the
laws of Indiana were being violated by the officers in denying the accused a
73. Id. at 240.
74. Id. at 241.

75. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 Sup. Ct. 781, 89 L. Ed. 1029 (1945)

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936) ; cf. Chambers

v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940); Lee v. Mississippi,

332 U.S. 742, 68 Sup. Ct. 300, 92 L. Ed. 330 (1948) (defendant does not lose his right
to contend that a confession was coerced by violence and threats of violence, by testifying that the confession was in fact never made).
76. Having been held incommunicado prior to preliminary hearing for an excessive
period without making a confession presents no constitutional issue. Townsend v. Burke
334 U.S. 736, 68 Sup. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948).

77. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944),
the Court had held that it was "inherently coercive" to hold Ashcraft incommunicado for

a period of 36 hours without sleep or rest, with relays of officers and lawyers questioning him without respite, even though the prisoner was subjected to no greater physical
mistreatment. Hence a conviction based upon an alleged confession secured by such
treatment violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The case came back to the Court in the
period under discussion because of an apparent misunderstanding as to what had been in-

validated in the first decision. The alleged confession of Ashcraft in the first trial had been

in writing although not written or signed by him. At the second trial the judge construed
the Supreme Court's mandate as prohibiting only the admission of the written unsigned
confession. Accordingly testimony narrating everything else that allegedly took place
during the entire 36-hour period was listened to by the jury including certain admissions. The Court saw "no relevant distinction" between the two situations so far
as the constitutional point was concerned and again reversed. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327
U.S. 274, 66 Sup. Ct. 544, 90 L. Ed. 667 (1946).
78. 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949).
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prompt preliminary hearing. It was further noted that he was without aid
of friends or counsel and without advice as to his constitutional rights.
"Disregard of rudimentary needs of life-opportunities for sleep and a decent
allowance of food-are also relevant, not as aggravating elements of petitioner's
treatment, but as part of the total situation out of which his confessions came and
which stamped their character.
"A confession by which life becomes forfeit must be the expressions of free choice.
A statement to be voluntary . ..need not be volunteered. But if it is the product
of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice. When a
suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under
such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of interrogation
and therefore the reverse of voluntary...
"Protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting disclosures or confessions is subversive
of the accusatorial system."'

Mr. Justice Black concurred merely on basis of previous decisions of the
Court. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, centering his attack on the inherent evil
of the police holding a prisoner without taking him before a magistrate. "We
should unequivocally condemn the procedure and stand ready to outlaw ...
any confession obtained during the period of the unlawful detention." 80 Mr.
Justice Jackson concurred in this case, and dissented in the two companion
cases. His opinion suggests the need for permitting the questioning of suspects by the police. He would invalidate the confession only where it was
obtained by violence or threats of violence (apparently found to exist in th
Watts case). s 1 Three justices dissented without opinion.
As in the Watts case the convictions in Turner v. Pennslyvania82 and
83
Harrisv. South Carolina
were for capital offenses and were based on confessions secured after extended questioning by officers after arrest and before
preliminary hearing. In the Turner case there was a five-day delay between
arrest and hearing (in violation of Pennsylvania statute). The defendant
was questioned over four different days for several hours at a time (not as
protracted as in Watts). He was not permitted to see friends or relatives;
he was not informed of his right to remain silent until after he actually made
his alleged confession. The defendant's signing of the confessions of suspected
coprincipals was also held to have been produced by the same tainted conduct
on part of officers.
In Harris v. South Carolina, the illiterate defendant was never given
a preliminary hearing. He was lodged in a jail on Sunday- and questioned
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

338 U.S. at 53, 55.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 60.
338 U.S. 62, 69 Sup. Ct. 1352, 93 L. Ed. 1810 (1949).
338 U.S. 68, 69 Sup. Ct. 1354, 93 L. Ed. 1815 (1949).
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on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday by officers (as many as twelve at a
time) working in relays. His confession came after several hours of questioning on Wednesday and a threat by the sheriff to arrest his mother.
Apparently, the accused was never told of his rights under South Carolina
law to secure a lawyer, to request a preliminary hearing, and to remain
silent. "The systematic persistence of interrogation, the length of the periods
of questioning, the failure to advise the petitioner of his rights, the absence of
friends or disinterested persons, and the character of the defendant constitute
a complex of circumstances which invokes"8' 4 the application of the principle
of the Watts case.
In the earlier case of Haley v. Ohio8 5 the Court set aside as contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment the conviction of a 15-year old Negro boy.
He had signed a confession after being questioned in relays by police from
midnight to 5 A.M. on Saturday morning. He was then held incommunicado
until being taken before a magistrate on the following Tuesday. A lawyer re-,
tained by his mother was denied permission to see him. The majority
opinion (by Douglas, J.) states that: "The age of petitioner, the hours
when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no
friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police toward his
rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child
by means which the law should not sanction."8 6 No weight was attached by
the Court under the circumstances to the recital in the written confession
that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to refrain from making a statement.
B. Federal Cases
There were no federal criminal cases decided during the period under
consideration which dealt with the constitutional aspects of detention of the
accused for the purpose of securing a confession. In the very important
case of Upshaw v. United States,8 7 a conviction was set aside which was
based on a confession secured during a thirty-hour period intervening between arrest and hearing before a magistrate. Such a detention violated Rule
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring the person arrested to be taken before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay." In
accordance with its special responsibilities for the administration of criminal
law in the Federal courts, the majority felt that the violation should prevent
the use of the confession, even though there was no "long, prolonged or con84. 338 U.S. at 71.
85. 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1948).
86. 332 U.S. at 600.
87. 335 U.S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REv. 472
(1949); cf. Haines v. United States, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2542 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 1951).
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tinuous" questioning, allegedly no "pyschological pressure" and no force
or violence. The case follows and extends the rule of McNabb v. United
States.88 The dissent (4 judges) insisted that the decision violates the principle
of McNabb, as explained in United States v. Mitchell,s0 to the effect that
pressure on the defendant is the necessary invalidating factor. The majority
distinguished Mitchell on the ground that there the confession came near the
beginning of the illegal detention. The majority opinion states expressly that
the holding is not placed on constitutional grounds. "[W]e need not and do
not consider whether their admission was a violation of any of the provisions
°
of the Fifth Amendment.""
4. FORMAL ACCUSATION OF CRIME 01

A. State Cases
Racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury has continued to
require the attention of the Court. In two cases during the period being
investigated it has reversed as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment convictions founded on indictments returned by grand juries in the selection of
whose membership there was found to be systematic exclusion of members
of the defendant's race. No new law was announced on the point; but the
willingness of the Court to find the facts of discrimination for itself on the
basis of reasonable inference from past experience continues to give the
right the greater vitality that it has enjoyed within recent years.
In the 1947 decision of Patton v. Mississippi,92 Mr. Justice Black, writing
for a unanimous court, summarized the law on the subject as follows:
"Sixty-seven years ago this Court held that state exclusion of Negroes from
grand and petit juries solely because of their race denied Negro defendants in
criminal cases the equal protection of the laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . A long and unbroken line of our decisions since then has reiterated
that principle, regardless of whether the discrimination was embodied in statute
or was apparent from the administrative practices of state jury selection officials,
and regardless of whether the system for depriving defendants of their rights
was 'ingenious or ingenuous.'"

It was then found that the inference of such systematic exclusion in a
county with a 35% Negro population arising from the fact that no Negro had
served on the grand jury for thirty years was not adequately dispelled by
the showing made by the State.
88.
89.
90.
91.

318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
322 U.S. 65, 64 Sup. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944).
335 U.S. at 414, N.2.
See Scott, The Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal Criminal
Juries, 34 IowA L. Rav. 577 (1949).
92. 332 U.S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76 (1947).
93. 332 U.S. at 465.
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Cassell v. Texas,94 decided in 1950, involved a much more difficult
problem, although only white men had been summoned for a grand jury
service. It was found that since the 1942 decision in Hill v. Texas 95 the number of Negroes serving on grand juries in Dallas County, Texas had not been
out of proportion to the ratio between the number of the race eligible to vote
in the county and total eligibles (based on poll-tax payment). 96 However,
it was charged that there was a policy by jury commissioners of choosing
not more than one Negro for each grand jury. The majority opinion (Reed,
J.) emphasized again that there is no constitutional right to have one or
more members of the accused's race actually on the grand jury.97 "An
accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the
selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of
race."08 The actual holding is based, however, on the testimony of the jury
commissioners that they chose jurymen with whom they were personally
acquainted, and at the time of the selection in question they knew no Negroes
available who were qualified. Such a statement in an area where Negroes
made up so large a proportion of the population was held to prove unconstitutional discrimination. A concurring opinion for three justices found discrimination in the uniform limitation to no more than one Negro per grand
jury. 99 Mr. Justice Jackson dissented, apparently feeling that the constitutional right is that of qualified Negroes to serve on the grand jury rather
than that of a Negro indicted by a grand jury from which Negroes are excluded. He would enforce such rights not to be excluded by imposition of
criminal or civil sanctions under the existing Federal statutes, 10 0 and not
interfere with the convictions of a defendant not shown to be prejudiced by
the exclusion. 10'
The case of In re Oliver,'." involving the Michigan "one-man grand
jury," is one of major importance in recent years. Its authority will probably
be related more to the constitutional aspects of fair trial and appeal than to
the investigational and accusational phases of criminal procedure. Under
the Michigan statute a circuit judge sat as a one-man grand jury with all
the usual powers of such bodies. He summarily committed Oliver to 60
94. 339 U.S. 282, 70 Sup. Ct. 269, 94 L. Ed. 839 (1950).

95. 316 U.S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942).
96. Cf. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945).

97. Cf. Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 68 Sup. Ct. 705, 92 L. Ed. 881 (1948),
involving conviction of Negro defendants in New York by a "blue-ribbon" trial jury
drawn from panel which included no Negroes.
98. 339 U.S. at 287.
99. Id. at 290.
100. 18 U.S.C.A. § 243 (criminal); 17 STAT. 13, c. 22, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43 (civil).
101. 339 U.S. at 298.
102. 333 U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948).
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days in jail for contempt for giving evasive answers in a secret examination
before him in chambers. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black held that
it was violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for an accused to be tried and
coniiicted for contempt of court in grand jury secrecy: "But, unless in Michigan and in one-man grand jury contempt cases, no court in this country has
ever before held, so far as we can find, that an accused can be tried, convicted,
and sent to jail, when everybody else is denied entrance to the court, except the
03
judge and his attaches.'.
It was further held that the failure to afford Oliver a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of false and evasive swearing was a
denial of due process of law. Recalcitrant grand jury witnesses are normally
taken into open court for any contempt proceedings and the judgment is that
such is required by the Constitution. Actually the majority opinion might
be considered as highly critical of the institution itself, although not finding
it necessary to condemn it in toto. Mr. Justice Rutledge in his concurring
opinion prefers outright condemnation of the whole arrangement as a "broad
...departure from so many specific constitutional guaranties .... ,104
Two cases involve constitutional significance of variance between formal
accusation of crime and the judgment of guilt. In Cole v. Arkansas'0 5 the
defendant was convicted under one section of a criminal statute under an
information charging violation of that section. The state supreme court
affirmed the conviction on the basis that another section of the statute had
been violated. This action deprived the defendant of his rights under the due
process clause, the Supreme Court held, reasoning that it was the same
result as if the defendant had been convicted without trial. In the case
of Paterno v. Lyons,10 however, it was held that there was no lack of due
process where the defendant was indicted for receiving stolen goods and was
permitted to plead guilty to attempted larceny. The defendant raised the
question after a subsequent conviction in an attempt to void the first conviction. The constitution of the state required indictment by a grand jury, but
the Supreme Court states that any question on this point is conclusively settled
by the state courts. The Court concludes that there being sufficient notice
of the charge and an intelligent decision to plead guilty to a related but lesser
offense there was no lack of due process.
103. 333 U.S. at 271.
104. Id. at 282.
105. 333 U.S. 196, 68 Sup. Ct. 514, 92 L. Ed. 644 (1948).
106. 334 U.S. 314, 68 Sup. Ct. 1044, 92 L. Ed. 1409 (1948).
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CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION
B. Federal Cases

The two recent cases of Blau v. United States107 are the only federal
cases during the period bearing on the accusational phase which were determined upon a constitutional basis. In each case the Supreme Court held
that the petitioners (husband and wife) could not be held in contempt for
refusing to answer questions relating to Communist party activities or
knowledge. The claim of constitutional privilege should have been sustained,
because the answers would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence
necessary in prosecution under recent federal legislation directed against Communists.
In Ballard v. United States'0 8 the Court under its power to supervise
the administration of criminal justice in the Federal Courts reversed the
conviction of the male leader of a sect in California because of the systematic
exclusion of women from the grand jury which returned the indictment (as
well as the petit jury). Since women were eligible under state law to serve
on juries their systematic exclusion failed to accord that representative crosssection of the community which is required in federal trials. "[A] flavor, a
distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded."' 109 The significant aspect of
the case is to extend the doctrine of Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 0° (invalidating systematic exclusion of wage earners in a civil suit) to the exclusion
of any group of eligibles which keeps the federal jury from being representative of the community.
CONCLUSION

This survey of recent decisions should demonstrate that it is not accurate to assert that the Supreme Court is unconcerned with the workings of
the machinery of criminal justice apart from the judicial process. While this
concern is not new it is obvious that in many respects the Court has made it
more articulate during the period under discussion. Furthermore, it has
very definitely pushed back to new limits the boundaries of permissible
"pressure" on the accused for the purpose of securing a confession. There has
been a willingness to look at the facts independently and to make it easier
for an accused to establish the truth of his contentions. At the same time the
Court has insisted that state court remedies be thoroughly exhausted before
the case is examined in federal courts, and has announced in general that
107. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 Sup. Ct. 223 (1950) ; Blau v. United

States, 340 U.S. 332, 71 Sup. Ct. 301 (1951).
108. 329 U.S. 187, 67 Sup. Ct. 261, 91 L. Ed. 181 (1946); cf. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 84-87, 62 Sup. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942) (women jurors selected from group trained by League of Women Voters).
109. 329 U.S. at 194.
110. 328 U.S. 217, 66 Sup. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181 (1946).
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state court findings on controverted facts will be taken as conclusive. This
question of finding the facts underlying the constitutional issue may very
well be the most important field for development in the future. In the realm
of search and seizure there has been the greatest variation in decision, primarily because there was a closely divided court in all of the more important
cases and a switch of one vote would change the basic philosophy of the
decision.
It seems clear that the Court is less likely today than five years ago to
upset on a constitutional basis a conviction for crime. The deaths of Justices
Murphy and Rutledge and other events have resulted in a percentage-wise
greater number of refusals to find or enforce in a particular case the alleged
"constitutional right." Nevertheless in the particular field under discussion
in this paper it seems that this more "conservative" Court is still actively concerned with decent criminal procedure. The present mood is not that of
venturing boldly into new areas for the enforcement of "rights." Instead, the
Court is entering a levelling-off period where most of what has thus far been
worked out as demanded by the Constitution in pretrial criminal law administration will be consistently applied.

